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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TATES, INC.,

\
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

I

L I T T L E AMERICA R E F I N I N G
CO., A Corporation dba L I T T L E
AMERICA,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
13681

Brief of Defendant-Respondent

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant submits that the plaintiff's Statement
of the Case is not accurate beyond the first two sentences. At the close of plaintiff's case, the defendant
moved that the Court dismiss the action on the grounds
that an accord and satisfaction had been established as
pleaded in the defendant's second defense, and that as a
1
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result the plaintiff's cause of action failed and the defendant's counterclaim failed (R. 84 and 85). The court
took the motion under advisement (R. 89, 1. 28). The
plaintiff then offered some additional testimony (R. 9093). The defendant then renewed the motion to dismiss
(R. 93, 1. 18) and the defendant proceeded, with the
motion under advisement (R. 93, 1. 20).
At the close of all the evidence and the arguments
of counsel, the court ruled that there was an accord and
satisfaction and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint and
the defendant's counterclaim on defendant's original
motion (R. 126).
The Findings of Fact and Judgment set out the
accord and satisfaction and the dismissal as ruled by the
court (R. 5-9).

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Defendant submits that the plaintiff seeks to reverse the decision of the lower court in finding an accord
and satisfaction and that the result of such a reversal
would of necessity be to remand the case to the District
Court to determine whether, absent the accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff made out a case, and in what
amount, and to consider the evidence on the defendant's
counterclaim and adjudicate the plaintiff's complaint
and the defendant's counterclaim.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant submits that the testimony offered by it
is not properly before this Court, since the motion to
dismiss as of the close of the plaintiff's case was granted
by the lower court.
Likewise, defendant will not respond to the portions of plaintiff's brief which relate to plaintiff's expense on the loaner bus, the sufficiency of the delivery
of the bus, or to Point I I I of plaintiff's brief which relates to that portion of plaintiff's cause of action and is
made irrelevant by the finding of an accord and satisfaction. Defendant will not answer plaintiff's argument
under Point I for the reason that whether there was a
valid contract for the purchase of the bus is also made
irrelevant under the court's finding and judgment that
there was an accord and satisfaction in February 1973.

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant ordered a bus from plaintiff by letter of
January 12, 1972, and purchase order of January 21,
1972 (Ex. I P and 2 P ) , which contemplate delivery in
approximately ninety days. The bus was delivered January 16, 1973, as shown by Exhibit 3P. I n the interim,
plaintiff supplied to defendant a loaner bus, which the
plaintiff purchased for the purpose (R. 57). Plaintiff
asked for a down payment on the bus and defendant declined through September and October 1972 (R. 61)
and made a deposit or down payment of $10,000 No-
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vember 3, 1972 (R. 62), at which time the plaintiff,
"advised Mr. Knight that you could assure him of delivery by the end of November and that's when he gave
you the deposit of $10,000," (R. 62, lines 1-3), which
was based upon what the factory had told Mr. Knaus,
his testimony being:
"My whole feeling about that is what the factory
had told me and then I promised him." (R. 62
lines 10-11)
Following the delivery of the bus in January 1973,
agents of the parties had a conversation (Mr. Knaus
and Mr. Knight—R. 65) which was followed by the
letter of February 12, 1973 (Ex. 6D). Exhibit 6D refers to the original promised delivery date and that
"As a result of the delay, we experienced much
aggravation and considerable expense.
"At the time we made a partial payment to you
in October we were assured that delivery would
be accomplished by the end of November.
"From the end of November until delivery of the
bus we experienced periods where the loaner bus
was non-operable. These bills are attached for
your information as follows: * * *"
Bills totaling $3,407.26 are itemized and attached. This
total is referred to in this manner:
"Total to be deducted from invoice $3,407.26."
On February 17, 1973, a check showing the deduction of $3,407.26 and the $10,000 down payment from
the original price was mailed to the plaintiff with the
4
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itemization of the dedeuctions and the down payment
(Ex. 7D).
Thereafter, Mr. Knaus called Mr. Knight of the
defendant and thanked him for the check (R. 69, line
2). About three weeks later Mr. Knaus and Mr. Urie
called on Mr. Knight and told him that the deductions
of $3,407.26 would not be allowed (R. 79, lines 3-5).
Mr. Knight informed them that the defendant would
not pay the amount (R. 82).

ARGUMENT
T H E R E W A S A N ACCORD A N D S A T I S F A C TION.
Defendant argued that if there was an accord and
satisfaction, it should be recognized by the court which
would result in dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and
the defendant's counterclaim without reference to who
would benefit most by the accord and satisfaction as
against their other claims (R. 84-86). Authorities were
cited to the court and are contained at page 86 of the
record, some of which are referred to hereafter.
There was a dispute between the parties as to what
was owing. Delivery of the bus had been long delayed,
defendant had suffered many inconveniences, a definite
promise of delivery date as of the end of November had
been made (R. 62) and the defendant claimed the right
to deduct expenses incurred after that date (November
30, 1972) until the bus was finally received in January.
5
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The defendant made clear its claim of offsets (Ex.
6D and 7D and R. 69) and submitted a check in full
payment after allowing the claimed offsets (Ex. 7D).
One of the leading cases on the subject of accord
and satisfaction is Stanley Thompson Liquor Co. v.
Southern Colorado Merc. Co., 65 Colo. 587, 178 P . 577
4 A.L.R, 471 (1919). In this case the court drew freely
from other authorities and autlined the elements of accord and satisfaction as follows:
"Where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute,
payment and acceptance of a less sum than
claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and
satisfaction." 178 P . 578.
The court explained that it is essential that there be
a disputed claim and that the creditor have notice that
the payment is offered in full satisfaction of the claim.
"When a claim is disputed or unliquidated and
the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof is of such character as to give the creditor notice that it must be accepted in full satisfaction of
the claim or not at all, the retention and use
thereof by the creditor constitutes an accord and
satisfaction." Id. at 579.
The court further explained that the notice to creditors
can be accomplished by the proper endorsement on the
check, by appropriate recitals on an accompanying
voucher, or by attendant circumstances which would
reasonably give notice to the creditor.
The facts in the Stanley Thompson case are nearly
identical to the present case. Defendant's letter (Ex-
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hibit 6-D) made very clear the fact that defendant's
check (Exhibit 7-D) was offered in full satisfaction of
the disputed claim and as the court in Stanley Thompson said, where
" . . . the check was received, endorsed and cashed,
and the money obtained thereon was retained by
the plaintiff . . . it must be held, therefore, that
the check was accepted on the conditions on which
it was offered, and that its acceptance constitutes
an accord and satisfaction." Id. at 579.
While the Stanley Thompson case is an older case,
it has been extensively followed in numerous jurisdictions, including: Montana, Sawyer v. Somers Lumber
Co., 86 Mont. 169, 282 P . 852; New Mexico, Frazier v.
Ray, 29 N.M. 121, 219 P . 429; Delaware, State v.
Massachusetts Bonding § Ins. Co., 40 Dela. 274, 9 A.2d
77; New York, Schnell v. Perlman, 238 N.Y. 362, 144
N . E . 641, 34 A.L.R. 1023; and Vermont, Siwooganock
Guaranty Savings Bank v. Cushman, 109 Vt. 221, 195
A. 260.
While this Court has recognized the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, Dillman v. Massey-F erguson,
Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962) ; Cheney v.
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963), defendant has not been able to find any Utah cases dealing
with accord and satisfaction which are directly on point.
However, two recent Idaho cases involve fact situations
nearly identical to the present case.
In Rush v. G-K Machinery Co., 84 Idaho 10, 367
P.2d 280 (1961), the plaintiff brought an action for the
7
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balance on an account allegedly due growing out of a
sale of heavy equipment. A dispute arose between plaintiff and defendant as to the price and the applicability
of certain credits. The defendant sent a check which
was accompanied by a letter making it clear that the
check was being tendered in full settlement. After reviewing the elements, the Court had no difficulty in
finding an accord and satisfaction. The Court indicated
that the law is clear:
"The creditor to whom a check is sent or other
remittance made as payment in full has the option either of accepting it on the conditions on
which it is sent, or of rejecting it. When a claim
is in dispute, and the debtor sends to his creditor
a check or other remittance which he clearly
states is in full payment of the claim, and the
creditor accepts the remittance or collects the
check without objection, it is generally recognized that this constitutes a good accord and satisfaction." 367 P.2d 284.
A second recent Idaho case, Nordling v. Whelchel
Mines Co., 90 Idaho 213, 409 P.2d 398 (1965), involved
a dispute over the applicability of a $133 offset against
rental payments on some mining equipment. The defendant sent a check accompanied by a letter explaining
that the check was tendered as payment in full. The
Court emphatically stated that upon cashing the check,
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction cut off any further claims of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff relies heavily on Dillman v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., supra. In Dillman this Court recognized
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the doctrine of accord and satisfaction but refused to
apply it to the facts of that particular case. In Dillman
the parties had a contract concerning the buy-back of
goods and the payment of bonuses. The parties agreed
that certain goods qualified for treatment under the
buy-back provisions, but disagreed concerning other
goods and the bonuses. A check was tendered, as payment in full, for the items agreed upon. This Court
properly ruled that the acceptance of the payment on
the agreed goods did not constitute an accord and satisfaction on the unagreed goods and bonuses. This Court
recognized that the agreement was divisible and certain
claims were liquidated while other claims were unliquidated. Paying the liquidated claims in full in no way
affected the unliquidated or disputed claims. This Court
wrote at 13 Utah 2d 144:
"The dispute as to what appellant had agreed to
buy back was not related to the payment made
for items actually bought back. There was no dispute as to the amount due for those items and,
therefore, it cannot be contended that the cashing of the check paying for such items constituted
an accord and satisfaction of a dispute as to
whether appellant has breached an agreement to
buy back other items it had rejected . . ."
The Dillman case has no application to the present
case. I t might conceivably apply if defendant had
agreed to buy two or more buses and the dispute arose
over the amount due for one particular bus when payment in full for another bus had been tendered. However, the facts of the present case are much different.
9
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W e have an unliquidated, disputed claim to which the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction properly applies.
Plaintiff also relies on Nevada Half Moon Mining
Co. v. Combined Metals Reduction Co., 176 F.2d 73
(10th Cir. 1949). While this case is somewhat helpful,
in that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
elements of accord and satisfaction, the facts are very
different.
The defendant had a contract to pay the plaintiff a
mineral royalty. Subsequent to the execution of the contract, the Office of Price Administration placed a ceiling
on the price of certain minerals. Shortly thereafter, the
United States Government established the Metals Reserve Company through which subsidy payments were
made to encourage the production of certain minerals.
A dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defendant as to how the royalties should be determined.
The defendant took the position that the royalties should
be based solely on mill returns under the O P A schedule,
while the plaintiff argued that they ought to be based
on the mill returns plus the subsidy payments.
A total of 57 royalty payments were made. All of
the 57 royalty payments were made by check with a
voucher attached showing that the royalty was based
solely on the mill returns. The defendant argued that
this was evidence of an accord and satisfaction.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
find an accord and satisfaction. The Court noted that
10
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the 57 royalty payments spanned a considerable length
of time and that some payments were made before the
establishment of the subsidy payments (and, therefore,
before the resulting controversy between plaintiff and
defendant) and some payments were made after. Yet,
as the Court pointed out:
"The checks, vouchers and settlement sheets
which combined delivered to Nevada were in the
same form both before and after the controversy
arose respecting the payment of the royalty on
the sums received from Metals Reserve Company. There was no change in them." 176 F.2d
76.
The Court went on to hold that the plaintiff was thus
never given notice that the payments were in settlement
of the dispute and, therefore, there could be no accord
and satisfaction.
The facts of the present case do not even begin to
approach the Tenth Circuit case where the real issue
was one of notice. There, the plaintiff and defendant
were involved in a lengthy series of installment payments, while here we have but one isolated transaction
between plaintiff and defendant. There, the Court
found that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to be put on notice when the payment pattern set
prior to the dispute was followed in an identical manner
after the dispute arose. Here, the defendant's letter
(Exhibit 6-D) and defendant's check (Exhibit 7-D),
together with the attendant circumstances, could reasonably be expected to give plaintiff notice, and the
Court below so held.
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Plaintiff accepted and cashed the check. When the
factory refused to cover plaintiff's resultant shrinkage,
the plaintiff, having eaten his cake, wanted the Court to
rule that it still had it.

CONCLUSION
The evidence showed a bona fide dispute as to what
was owing, a check tendered as full payment after making certain claimed deductions or offsets, notice to the
plaintiff of the claim, acceptance of the check, with
thanks, and a later change of heart. The District Court
soundly ruled there was an accord and satisfaction. This
Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
By R I C H A R D L. B I R D , J R .
G R E G O R Y L. S E A L
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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